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JURISTICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-4-103(2)(b) and G)(2008).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-405(2007) and 10-9a-801 (2007). See Addendum
1.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A municipality's decision to expand or contract its boundaries is more than
a zoning or land use matter. The decision involves the fundamental relationship
associated with a body politic and citizenship, including voting rights, extension of
municipal services, tax burden, and jurisdiction over public health, safety and
welfare generally.

As such, provided a municipality follows the statutory

requirements prescribed by the state legislature, as it is undisputed that Park City
("City") did in the instant case, courts must refrain from substituting their
judgment regarding this inherently legislative and political decision.

Despite

pages and pages of allegations by Appellant Merrill dba Quinn's Junction
Partnership ("QJP"), which for purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion must be accepted as
true, the trial court properly concluded that QJP failed to specifically allege how
this particular vote by three Park City council members was arbitrary, capricious
or illegal. The City Council decision simply ended further consideration of QJP's
petition for annexation. The City Council adopted no law or ordinance with
respect to QJP's property and the property remains subject to the zoning and
1

jurisdiction of Summit County. Therefore, the City's decision to reject the petition
was neither a regulation nor a denial of all economic use of the property and QJP's
claim of inverse condemnation must also fail.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED QJP'S CASE
UNDER AN ARBITARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL
STANDARD.
Annexation decisions involve two aspects: 1) procedural; and 2) political.

Courts and municipal scholars have consistently viewed compliance with the
procedural or technical requirements of state enabling statutes as jurisdictional (or
conditions precedent) to the municipality's political decision to grant or deny
annexation. As such, judicial review is typically limited to compliance with these
statutory requirements, unless otherwise provided by statute.
"The scope of a review of proceedings to change municipal boundaries
ordinarily is limited to matters judicial in character and which are within the
framework of pertinent statutory provisions, unless they are based on arbitrary or
unreasonable acts in excess of authority, or unless by statute a reviewing court has
jurisdiction to consider them."
McQuillin Mun. Corp. §7.41 (2007)(emphasis added).
No such statute exists in Utah. QJP cites to Child v. Spanish Fork, 538
P.2d 184 (Utah 1975), for the trail court's authority to review an annexation
decision. (Appellant Brief at 21). The trial court also properly relied on this case
in its decision, but provided a larger citation that more fully captures the scope of
review:
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[A] determination of city boundaries is a legislative function... as in all
legislative matters, courts are reluctant to interfere therewith; and do so
only when the decisions or actions taken are clearly outside the authority of
the governing body, or are so wholly unreasonable and unjust that they
must be deemed capricious and arbitrary in adversely affecting someone's
rights.
Child v. Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184, 186 (Utah 1975) (citing Bradshaw v. Beaver
City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 138 (Utah 1972)).

A determination of illegality cannot be

sustained by vague accusations, but requires a determination that the decision
violates a specific law, ordinance or regulation at the time the decision is made.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(d).

Absent any allegation of statutory non-

compliance or illegality, the burden shifts further against the challenger to
demonstrate that under no circumstances could it be reasonably debatable that
City's decision was in furtherance of the general health, safety and welfare. Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3)(b); see also Harmon City, Inc v. Draper City, 2000
Utah App 31, 997 P.2d 321 (upholding denial of rezone because plaintiff failed to
demonstrate existing zoning could not promote the general welfare).
In this case, the trial court correctly determined that "Plaintiff recites a
litany of allegations, many of which concern decisions, agreements, and other
matters that are not before the court in relation to plaintiffs petition for review
....". (App. Brief Addendum 2 at p. 3). The petition for annexation was filed in
January, 2005. (App. Brief at 14, ^ 56). On appeal, QJP again asks that attention
be given to facts that span over fifteen years that were not part of the record before

3

the City Council and therefore are not pertinent to the petition for review.

Utah

Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(8).
Without any facts specific to the action of the voting council members in
March of 2005, QJP cannot sustain a claim for which relief could be granted
because no statutory non-compliance or specific misconduct is alleged. Braunagel
v. City of Devils Lake, 2001 ND 118, 629 N.W.2d 567 (affirming city denial of
annexation holding even where City possessed extra-territorial zoning authority
"declaratory and injunctive relief, while available to challenge a municipality's
failure to comply with statutory procedures for annexation or zoning, may not be
used to challenge the wisdom, propriety, or correctness of the decision.")
Therefore, QJP has stated a claim for which no judicial relief may be granted
against Park City, and the trial court's decision dismissing the first claim with
prejudice should be affirmed.

II.

APPELLANT'S
ALLEGATIONS
CONCERNING
PARK
CITY'S ALLEGED INTENTIONS FOR THE QUINNS
PROPERTY EVEN IF VIEWED MOST FAVORABLY TO QJP
DO NOT CONCERN THIS PARTICULAR LEGISLATIVE
DECISION

The trial court correctly ruled that QJP's long list of fact allegations do not
substantiate it claim regarding this particular government action. (Appellant Brief,
Addendum 2 at 6). In so doing, the trial court's ruling is consistent with Utah
authority which clearly holds that such claims are the very general allegations that
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are really conclusions of law meant to be avoided by limited judicial inquiry into
legislative discretion of the Council. Bradshaw v. Beaver City, 493 P.2d 643, 645
(Utah 1972). If QJP feels its rights were violated by prior legislative acts in
Summit County or by the City, it must properly assert such claims under a specific
cause of action.
QJP's only fact evidence regarding the actual City Council decision on
March 10, 2005 demonstrates that there were stated concerns on the record about
contiguity, creating an island and conformance with the guidelines contained in
the general plan. Appellant Brief at 14-15, f 60-63. Despite the fact that QJP
disagrees with the Council's decision, QJP's recital of these facts alone
demonstrates that the Council had a reasonably debatable basis to deny further
consideration of the petition. (Appellant Brief Addendum 2 at 6).
Bradshaw does not breathe life into Plaintiffs claims spanning twenty
years. In Bradshaw, the court merely evaluated whether certain conditions of
approval at issue constituted an unlawful delegation of statutory authority by the
city. Id. at 645. Therefore, the City asserts Bradshaw further illustrates the City's
position that for the court to interfere there needs to be an allegation of violation of
such express statutory language. QJP makes no such specific allegation regarding
an "act" by the Council. Off the record innuendo and verbal representations of
individual staff members or officials, even if they must be accepted as true for
purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion, are not "acts" of the City. See Stucker v. Summit
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County, 870 P.2d 283, 290 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(holding individual Planning
Director direction to applicant is not an "act" of the Plarming Commission.)
Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that QJP failed to demonstrate
"that the Council's action 'was outside of its authority or is so wholly discordant
to reason and justice that its action must be deemed capricious and arbitrary and
thus in violation of plaintiff s rights'." (Appellant Brief, Addendum 2 at p. 7).

III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE
MARCH 10, 2005 REJECTION OF AN ANNEXATION
PETITON IS NOT AN INVERSE CONDEMNATION OF THE
QJP PROPERTY.

The Utah Constitution provides in pertinent part that f'[p]rivate property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." UTAH
CONST. ART. I §22. "For purposes of that constitutional provision, an inverse
condemnation action requires (1) property, (2) a taking or damages, and (3) a
public use." Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241,
1243-44 (Utah 1990).
A. APPELLANT HAS NO PROPERTY INTEREST IN A FAVORABLE
ANNEXATION DECISION, THEREFORE PLAINTIFF HAS
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM FOR INVERSE CONDEMNATION.
The trial court properly found that, although the QJP "may have certain
expectations about its property [those expectations] do[] not equate to a vested
property interest affected by [Park City's annexation decision."] (Appellant Brief,
Addendum 2 at p. 9). The first element in the test for an inverse condemnation is
that the plaintiff must have a property interest that has been affected by a
6

governmental action. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., supra. QJP has not
identified what particular property interest has been taken or damaged through
City action. No property interests are created or destroyed pursuant to a denial of
municipal annexation.

See Mogan v. City of Harlem, 775 P.2d 686, 689

(Mont.l989)(City's denial of permits neither created nor took away any property
interests, and therefore the plaintiff had no interests subject to Fifth Amendment
jurisprudence.). Similarly, QJP in this case has not asserted any property interest
that has been affected by the City's denial of a municipal annexation. See Bagford
v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995)(failing to regard oral agreements
regarding utilities as protected property interests absent a written, exclusive
franchise contract).
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the concept that a petitioner "may
establish a 'taking' simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to
exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for
development is quite simply untenable." Perm Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). In the present case, QJP has not been denied even
one of the sticks in the bundle of rights associated with his property, because no
property interests were created or destroyed when the City denied the petition for
annexation. QJP has the same rights that it had prior to filing for annexation. Like
Perm Central such a denial cannot rise to the level of a fundamental attribute of
property ownership subject to the Fifth Amendment Takings provision.
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B. REJECTION OF AN ANNEXATION PETITION IS NOT A
REGULATION;
THEREFORE,
THERE
CAN
BE
NO
REGULATORY TAKING OR INVERSE CONDEMNATION.
The trial court was correct when it found that "Park City's Council decision
placed no [] restriction on plaintiffs use of his property." (Appellant Brief,
Addendum 2 at p. 10). The second element of the test for inverse condemnation
determines whether there has been a taking or damage to the property in question.
Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 803 P.2d at 1243-44. The only government
action alleged is the denial of the City's willingness to regulate the property.
QJP's repeated references to other acts by Park City or other jurisdictions have no
bearing on the specific issue, the denied annexation petition, litigated here. QJP's
land resides within Summit County, not within the municipal boundaries of Park
City.

(Appellant Brief , f 1.) Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-102(2) limits municipal

land use authority to "land within the municipality...". Therefore, Appellant has
no basis in law, based upon the facts alleged, to claim a regulatory taking. After
all, the genesis of this case is the City's denial of the QJP's petition for
annexation, where the City formally refused to assume regulatory authority over
the QJP's property.

Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that the

City's rejection of an annexation petition was not a regulation and the trial court's
dismissal of count 2 with prejudice should be affirmed.
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C. IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE APPLICABLE COUNTY ZONING
CONTINUES TO APPLY AND THEREFORE THERE CAN BE NO
SHOWING THAT QJP HAS BEEN DEPRIVED ALL ECONOMIC
USE OF THE PROPERTY
Finally, even if the court somehow found a property interest and some
infringement by the City with that interest for public use, "an infringement that
leaves virtually the whole of the owner's possessory rights intact does not
constitute a taking." McAndrews v. Fleet Bank of Mass., 989 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir.
1993). Since the City's denial of annexation has not altered the QJP's possessory
rights in any way, and County zoning continues to apply, QJP cannot as a matter
of law assert that they have been deprived all economic use of the property.
Braunagel, supra (holding the City's denial of a petition for annexation cannot
constitute a taking for public use); see Intermountain Sports, Inc. v. DOT, 2004
UT App 405, 109 P.3d 804, cert denied 109 P.3rd 804 (Utah 2005), cert denied,
546 U.S 817, 126 S.Ct. 343, 163 L.Ed. 2d 54 (2005) (affirming motion to dismiss
inverse condemnation because plaintiff had no property interest in preferred access
and alternative access existed).
QJP contends that Creekside Associates, Inc. v. City of Wood Dale, 684 F.
Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill 1988), provides support for the argument that denial of an
annexation petition can amount to a restriction on the use of property. However,
Creekside is inapplicable.

In Creekside, development in unincorporated land

surrounding the City of Wood Dale was prohibited by Wood Dale municipal code
until such land was incorporated into the City. Id, In this case, there is no such
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restriction in state or local codes. To the contrary, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-403
provides that "when the plan of the municipality involves territory outside the
boundaries of the municipality, the municipality may not take action affecting that
territory without the concurrence of the county or other municipalities affected."
The result of Park City's denial of the annexation petition is that QJP's property
remains subject, as it was before the petition, to Summit County zoning and
regulation. Regardless of any of QJP's allegations regarding the City's general
plan, QJP cites no authority for its proposition that it had a protectable property
interest in better or higher density City zoning and/or an affirmative annexation
decision.
While QJP may have other issues regarding potential as applied or facial
challenges to such applicable County zoning, those matters must be litigated in a
different forum under an appropriate cause of action, not collaterally here. In the
instant case, QJP has stated a claim for which no judicial relief may be granted
against Park City, and the trial court's decision dismissing the second claim of
relief for inverse condemnation with prejudice should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Park City rendered a legal and valid decision regarding a legislative
question properly before it in full compliance with applicable state statutes. QJP
failed to allege facts that demonstrate it could not be reasonably debatable that the
majority decision by the City Council on March 10, 2005 regarding an a petition
10

filed in 2004 failed to be in the general health, safety and welfare of the residents
of Park City. In denying the petition, Park City did not exercise any regulatory
control over QJP's property. Therefore, the trial court properly ruled that plaintiff
failed to allege facts regarding an "act" of the City to sustain a claim for which
relief may be granted. The trail court's ruling should be affirmed.

DATED this 31 st day of December, 2008.
PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

Mark Harrington
Park City Municipal'Corporation
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
Park City Municipal Corporation
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ADDENDA
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-405 (2007)

B.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801 (2007)

ADDENDUM "A"
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2 of 5 DOCUMENTS
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** ARCHIVE DATA ***
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** AND THE NOVEMBER 2007 ELECTION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2008 UT 5 (2/1/2008); 2008 UT APP 43 ***
*** (2/14/2008) AND JANUARY 1, 2008 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 10. UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE
CHAPTER 2. INCORPORATION, CLASSIFICATION, BOUNDARIES, CONSOLIDATION, AND DISSOLUTION
OF MUNICIPALITIES
PART 4. ANNEXATION
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-405 (2007)
§ 10-2-405. Acceptance or rejection of an annexation petition - Modified petition

(1) (a) (i) (A) A municipal legislative body may:
(I) except as provided in Subsection (l)(b) and subject to Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B), deny a petition filed under
Section 10-2-403; or
(II) accept the petition for further consideration under this part.
(B) A petition shall be considered to have been accepted for further consideration under this part if a
municipal legislative body fails to act to deny or accept the petition under Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A):
(I) in the case of a city of the first or second class, within 14 days after the filing of the petition; or
(II) in the case of a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or a town, at the next regularly scheduled meeting
of the municipal legislative body that is at least 14 days after the date the petition was filed.
(ii) If a municipal legislative body denies a petition under Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A), it shall, within five days of
the denial, mail written notice of the denial to the contact sponsor, the clerk of the county in which the area proposed for
annexation is located, and the chair of the planning commission of each township in which any part of the area proposed
for annexation is located,
(b) A municipal legislative body may not deny a petition filed under Section 10-2-403 proposing to annex an area
located in a county of the first class if:
(i) the petition contains the signatures of the owners of private real property that:
(A) is located within the area proposed for annexation;
(B) covers a majority of the private land area within the area proposed for annexation; and
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(C) is equal m value to at least 1/2 of the value of all private real property within the area proposed for
annexation,
(n) the population in the area proposed for annexation does not exceed 10% of the population of the proposed
annexing municipality,
(in) the property tax rate for municipal services m the area proposed to be annexed is higher than the property
tax rate of the proposed annexing municipality, and
(IV) all annexations by the proposed annexing municipality during the year that the petition was filed have not
increased the municipality s population by more than 20%
(2) If the municipal legislative body accepts a petition under Subsection (l)(a)(i)(A) or is considered to have
accepted the petition under Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B), the city recorder or town clerk, as the case may be shall, within 30
days of that acceptance
(a) obtain from the assessor, clerk, surveyor, and recorder of the county in which the area proposed for annexation
is located the records the city recorder or town clerk needs to determine whether the petition meets the requirements of
Subsections 10 2-403(2), (3), and (4),
(b) with the assistance of the municipal attorney, determine whether the petition meets the requirements of
Subsections 10 2-403(2), (3), and (4), and
(c) (l) if the city recorder or town clerk determines that the petition meet* those requirements, certify the petition
and mail or deliver written notification of the certification to the municipal legislative body, the contact sponsor, the
county legislative body, and the chair of the planning commission of each township in which any part of the area
proposed for annexation is located, or
(n) if the city recorder or town clerk determines that the petition fails to meet any of those requirements, reject
the petition and mail or deliver written notification of the rejection and the reasons for the rejection to the municipal
legislative body, the contact sponsor, the county legislative body, and the chair of the planning commission of each
township in which any part of the area proposed for annexation is located
(3) (a) (l) If the city recorder or town clerk rejects a petition under Subsection (2)(c)(n), the petition may be
modified to correct the deficiencies for which it was rejected and then refiled with the city recorder or town clerk, as the
case may be
(n) A signature on an annexation petition filed under Section 10-2-403 may be used toward fulfilling the
signature requirement of Subsection 10 2-403(2)(b) for the petition as modified under Subsection (3)(a)(i)
(b) If a petition is refiled under Subsection (3)(a) after having been rejected by the city recorder or town clerk
under Subsection (2)(c)(n), the refiled petition shall be treated as a newly filed petition under Subsection 10-2-403(1)
(4) Each county assessor, clerk, surveyor, and recorder shall provide copies of records that a city recorder or town
clerk requests under Subsection (2)(a)
HISTORY: C 1953, 10-2-405, enacted by L 1997, ch 389, § 31, 1997 (2nd S S ), ch 3, § 10, 2000, ch 193, § 2,
2001, ch 206, § 5, 2002, ch 29, § 1, 2003, ch 211, § 1, 2003, ch 292, § 7,2004, ch 90, § 3
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES -The 2003 amendment by ch 211, effective May 5, 2003, rewrote Subsection (2)(a) which
read ' with the assistance of the municipal attorney and of the clerk, surveyor and recorder of the county in which the

Page 3
Utah Code Ann § 10-2-405

area proposed for annexation is located, deteimme whether the petition meets the requirements of Subsections
10-2-403(2), (3), and (4)", added Subsection (2)(b), rewrote Subsection (4) which read "Each county clerk, surveyor,
and recorder shall cooperate with and assist a city recorder or town clerk in the determination under Subsection (2)(a)M,
and designated former Subsection (l)(b) as Subsection (l)(c)
The 2003 amendment by ch 292, effective May 5, 2003, added "fourth, or fifth' in Subsection (l)(a)(i)(B)(II)
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, substituted "Subsection (2)(c)(n)' for 'Subsection (2)(b)(n)' twice in
Subsection (3)
CROSS-REFERENCES --Modification of boundaries, notice to lieutenant governer, § 10-1-116
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Conditions to annexation
Recordation of map or plat
Substantial compliance
- Not found
CONDITIONS TO ANNEXATION
City council did not abdicate its responsibility by attaching reasonable conditions to an annexation resolution, even
though later acts of a development company were required to fulfill the conditions so as to make the annexation
effective Bradshaw v Beaver City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P 2d 643 (1972)
City was permitted to provide for added or expanded services by imposition of reasonable conditions precedent to the
annexation of new territory, and its demand for transfer of water rights in return for annexation was not inconsistent
with, nor m excess of, the powers of the city council, nor was it unreasonable and arbitrary Child v City of Spanish
Fork, 538 P 2d 184 (Utah 1975)
City had no duty to issue bonds, thus obligating entire city to pay for the acquisition of additional water needed as
result of annexation, m order to avoid requiring transfer of annex area property owners' water rights to the city as a
condition precedent to annexation Child v City of Spanish Fork, 538 P 2d 184 (Utah 1975)
RECORDATION OF MAP OR PLAT
When the corporate limits of a city are extended, a certified copy of an accurate map or plat showing the territory to
be annexed must be recorded in the office of the county recorder of the proper county before annexation is complete
Plutus Mining Co v Orme, 76 Utah 286, 289 P 132 (1930)
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
- NOT FOUND
Failure of a city to file a certified copy of annexation ordinance with the county recorder for over three years was not
substantial compliance with former § 10-3-1, and the purported annexation was void Johnson v Sandy City Corp, 28
Utah 2d 22, 497 P 2d 644 (1972)
USER NOTE For more generally applicable notes, see notes under the first section of this article, part, chapter, subtitle,
or title
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*** ARCHIVE DATA***
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** AND THE NOVEMBER 2007 ELECTION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2008 UT 5 (2/1/2008), 2008 UT APP 43 ***
*** (2/14/2008) AND JANUARY 1, 2008 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 10 UTAH MUNICIPAL CODE
CHAPTER 9a MUNICIPAL LAND USE, DEVELOPMENT, AND MANAGEMENT
PART 8 DISTRICT COURT REVIEW
Utah Code Ann § J0-9a-80J (2007)
§ 10-9a-801 No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted - Time for filing - Tolling of time Standards governing court review — Record on review - Staying of decision

(1) No person may challenge m district court a municipality's land use decision made under this chapter, or under a
regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the person's administrative remedies as
provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made m the exercise of or m violation of the provisions of
this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court withm 30 days after the local land use
decision is final
(b) (l) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property owner files a request
for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property rights ombudsman under Section 13-43-204 until 30
days after*
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award, or
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a wntten statement under Subsection 13-43-204(3)(b) declining to
arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator
(n) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific constitutional taking issue that is the
subject of the request for arbitration filed with the property nghts ombudsman by a property owner
(in) A request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman after the time under Subsection (2)(a) to
file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a petition.
(3) (a) The courts shall.
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this chapter is valid, and
(n) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capncious, or illegal
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(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is valid if it is reasonably
debatable that the decision, ordinance, or regulation promotes the purposes of this chapter and is not otherwise illegal
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authonty is valid if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or regulation violates a law,
statute, or ordinance m effect at the time the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation adopted
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the municipality takes final action on a land
use application for any adversely affected third party, if the municipality conformed with the notice provisions of Part 2,
Notice, or for any person who had actual notice of the pending decision
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the enactment of a land use ordinance
or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than 30 days after the enactment
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's decision is final
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the reviewing court the
record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if available, a true and correct transcript of its
proceedings
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true and correct transcript for
purposes of this Subsection (7)
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by the land use authonty or
appeal authority, as the case may be.
(n) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use authority or appeal
authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the land use authority or appeal authority,
respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence.
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use authonty or authority appeal authonty, as
the case may be
(b) (l) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a constitutional taking
issue under Section 13-43-204, the aggrieved party may petition the appeal authority to stay its decision
(n) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authonty may order its decision stayed pending distnct court
review if the appeal authority finds it to be m the best interest of the municipality
(in) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a constitutional taking
issue is filed under Section 13-43-204, the petitioner may seek an injunction staying the appeal authority's decision.
HISTORY: C 1953, 10-9-1001, enacted by L 1991, ch 235, § 53, 1992, ch 30, § 13, 1999, ch 291, § 3, 2003, ch
124, § 3, 2004, ch 223, § 2, renumbered by L 2005, ch 254, § 69, 2007, ch 306, § 7, 2007, ch 363, § 4
NOTES:
AMENDMENT NOTES -The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, added ' or in violation of" in Subsection
(2)(a)
The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, substituted "property rights" ior "private property" throughout

